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INTRODUCTION 
Eileen Goldberg was just one among 35,000 California 
residents to get a letter from data broker ChoicePoint telling her 
that her personal information had been stolen from the company.1  
But perhaps distinguishing her from most of the other recipients, 
Goldberg’s son, Michael, works for a Los Angeles class action law 
firm, and Goldberg claims the dubious honor of being the first 
person to file an action against ChoicePoint in the data breach 
case.2  In this class action, filed just days after she was notified and 
contrary to what generally has been allowed in identity theft 
litigation in the past, the attorneys are seeking to include both 
plaintiffs whose data was compromised and those whose 
information appears not to have been used.3  Goldberg is a member 
of the latter group, and her action seeks new standards for 
ChoicePoint and the data broker business as a whole.4 
Like Goldberg’s story, crimes involving the theft of personal 
information receive a great deal of media attention.  Almost daily, 
there is a breach of some system where personal information, 
customer records, credit card numbers, or debit card numbers have 
fallen either into the wrong hands or out of the right hands. 
This note attempts to classify the existing laws and rules that 
have been applied to unauthorized data movements by looking at 
 
 1 Verne Kopytoff, 35,000 in State To Receive Warning Personal Information Stolen in 
October, Georgia Firm Says, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 19, 2005, at A3; Patti Bond, 
ChoicePoint: Plaintiffs Ready To Try New Angles, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 8, 2005, at 
F1. 
 2 Bond, supra note 1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
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the breadth of approaches.  Part I will look at the existing laws and 
rules, focusing on California and Florida law, as examples of two 
different approaches.  Part II will look at data breaches, suggesting 
that they can be categorized into four types (negligence, crime, low 
standards, and loss of control).  Part III will conclude, relying on 
the incidents and information coming before it, that it is not yet 
time for a federal law on data protection, but instead that the states 
and the courts need time to tease out the elements that will best 
protect personal information.  Part III will also assert that, while it 
is easy to see data protection as a legal and political issue, 
companies must assume responsibility for the protection of their 
customers’ and clients’ data if the internet economy and internet 
access to the traditional economy are to survive. 
I. EXISTING LAWS AND RULES 
A. What Is Privacy? 
For the electronic economy to continue to grow, consumers and 
businesses clamor for clearly defined and responsibly executed use 
of personal data and associated activities.  But what exactly 
comprises privacy and what information—held by whom—should 
be treated with respect for its “privacy” is a murky issue.5  For the 
sake of this Note, privacy will be defined generally as those 
attributes which constitute “personally identifiable information,”6 
 
 5 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006); 
see also Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002). 
 6 Personally identifiable information is a definition still in motion.  The European 
Union Data Protection Directive defines “personal data” as “any information relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity.” Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art. 2(a), at 38. 
The California statutes define “personal information” as: 
an individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination with any 
one or more of the following data elements, when either the name or the data 
elements are not encrypted: 
(1) Social security number. 
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including (but not limited to) an individual’s name, address, phone 
numbers, place of employment, credit card numbers, social 
security number, health records, transactional records, or any other 
identifying element with which another individual could act as 
though he were the original person.  These actions could be simple 
and innocent, such as causing the delivery of marketing email, or 
nefarious and extreme, such as the range of activities that 
constitute identity theft.7  This information may be collected 
 
(2) Driver’s license number or California Identification Card number. 
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination with any 
required security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an 
individual’s financial account. 
(f) For purposes of this section, “personal information” does not include 
publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general 
public from federal, state, or local government records. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)–(f) (2006). 
 
Florida law defines “Personal identification information” as 
any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other 
information, to identify a specific individual, including any: 
1. Name, postal or electronic mail address, telephone number, social 
security number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, official state-issued 
or United States-issued driver’s license or identification number, alien 
registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer 
identification number, Medicaid or food stamp account number, bank 
account number, credit or debit card number, or personal identification 
number or code assigned to the holder of a debit card by the issuer to 
permit authorized electronic use of such card; 
2. Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris 
image, or other unique physical representation; 
3. Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code; 
4. Medical records; 
5. Telecommunication identifying information or access device; or 
6. Other number or information that can be used to access a person’s 
financial resources. 
FLA. STAT. § 817.568.1(f) (2005). 
 7 Some of the literature combines discussion of the breach of information and the theft 
of an identity, but this piece will focus on the data breach and the subsequent activity 
with that, regardless of what comprises the activity.  For a helpful list of identity theft 
actions that resulted in criminal prosecution, see Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of State Statutes Relating to Offense of Identity Theft, 125 
A.L.R.5TH 537 (2005). 
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overtly or not in the course of business transactions, by the 
government, or by non-profit organizations.8 
The right to privacy has long confused and confounded average 
Americans, who often presume a Constitutional right to privacy 
that doesn’t explicitly exist.9  While most scholars accept that there 
is some sort of derived right to some sort of privacy, “the right to 
privacy has been poorly articulated and only vaguely theorized.”10 
In contrast, in many European countries national privacy laws were 
generally in place by the early 1990’s,11 with some dating back to 
the 1970’s,12 and a European Union Directive has been in force for 
more than a decade, setting minimum levels of national 
legislation.13  Additionally, the European Union has a Directive on 
Electronic Commerce that acts as the “legal framework” for e-
commerce among member countries.14  The United States, on the 
other hand, relies on a “sectoral . . . mix of legislation, regulation, 
 
 8 Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 
S.C. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (2005).  These “entities . . . assemble, update, manage, and use 
masses of computerized information relating to individuals.” Id. at 255.  Johnson further 
defines the data as including “names, relationships (e.g., family members and employers), 
contact information (e.g., phone numbers, residences, and virtual addresses), personal 
histories (e.g., birth dates, medical data, physical characteristics, and educational 
records), official identifiers (e.g., social security, driver’s license, and passport numbers), 
and financial records (e.g., bank, credit card, frequent flyer, and investment account 
numbers).” Id. at 256. 
 9 See generally Oliver Ireland & Rachel Howell, The Fear Factor: Privacy, Fear, and 
the Changing Hegemony of the American People and the Right to Privacy, 29 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 671, 671–74, 688–89 (2004) (tracing through the case law and 
outlines the major legislative elements that comprise the United States’ privacy laws); see 
also PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 29–90 (1996) 
(discussing the Constitutional Law approach). 
 10 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. 
REV. 1149, 1155 (2005). 
 11 PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 23 (1998). 
 12 HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1999) (noting that 
France, Germany, and Great Britain all enacted privacy regulations in the 1970’s). 
 13 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 14 Directive on Electronic Commerce, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.  See, e.g., the European 
Commission’s Electronic Commerce portal, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/e-commerce/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
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and self regulation”15 in privacy regulation that is “riddled with 
gaps and weak spots.”16 
B. Federal Privacy Laws 
In the United States, legislation exists to address the use of 
credit reports in the form of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,17 to 
limit the personal information that state motor vehicle agencies can 
release about licensees in the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act,18 to 
control the information held on individuals by government 
agencies and how it may be disclosed in the Privacy Act of 1974,19 
and to govern the disclosure of medical information in the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.20  The federal 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) serves as the primary 
means by which unauthorized access to computer systems, 
including data access and theft cases, are prosecuted.21 Access 
device fraud22 and wire fraud23 are similarly covered by federal 
laws.  The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act,24 enacted in 
July 2004, stiffens the penalty for use of another’s identification 
during the commission of any of a list of more than a hundred 
felonies, including wire fraud, misuse of a Social Security number, 
 
 15 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, available at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).  “The 
European Union, however, relies on comprehensive legislation that, for example, requires 
creation of government data protection agencies, registration of data bases with those 
agencies, and in some instances prior approval before personal data processing may 
begin.” Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents, available at  
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_documents.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). 
 16 Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 
U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357 (2006) [hereinafter Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime]. 
 17 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2006). 
 18 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000). 
 19 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2006). 
 20 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 210 (2006)). 
 21 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2006). 
 22 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (2006). 
 23 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (2006). 
 24 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028A(a)(1), (c) (2006).  For an overview, see MADELEINE 
SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY, PART II 199–518 (CAROLINA 
ACADEMIC PRESS 2003). 
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or passport fraud.25  Other laws address similar narrowly focused 
issues.26  But there are also wide gaps where information is not 
protected, and no single overriding consumer-targeted law exists 
that protects the information stored by companies and the 
government from abuse, or gives those whose information is 
misused or abused a personal right of action.27  And that lack of a 
safety net is affecting the behavior of American consumers, by 
some estimates keeping as many as a third of those over the age of 
fourteen from making purchases through the internet.28 
C. Privacy in Online Activity 
The consumer advocacy group the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse warns consumers that “[o]ften the level of privacy 
you can expect from an online activity will be clear from the nature 
of that activity.  Sometimes, however, an activity that appears to be 
private may not be.  There are virtually no online activities or 
services that guarantee absolute privacy.”29  This message to 
consumers is reiterated every day in news headlines, highlighting 
the intersection between privacy and data security, and attacks on 
the latter that result in the loss of privacy in the former.  
Informational privacy has been defined as “the claim of 
individuals, groups, and institutions ‘to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.’”30  Understanding the increasing 
 
 25 Sean B. Hoar, Trends In Cybercrime: The Dark Side of the Internet, 20-FALL CRIM. 
JUST. 4, 8 (2005). 
 26 INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 15–80 (Jody R. Westby ed., 2004).  See, 
generally, Ireland & Howell, supra note 9, at 674–88.  There is extensive literature 
tracing and distinguishing the existing federal laws. See, e.g., MADELEINE SCHACHTER, 
supra note 24. 
 27 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (2006), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 
(2006), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028(a)(1), (c) (2006). 
 28 The Online Fear Factor: Phishing and Keylogging and Fraud. Oh, My!, 
EMARKETER, Mar. 14, 2006, available at http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx? 
1003865. 
 29 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy in Cyberspace: Rules of the Road for the 
Information Superhighway, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs18-cyb.htm (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2006) (emphasis in original). 
 30 RICHARD A. GLENN, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 
205 (ABC-CLIO 2003) (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (Atheneum 
1967)). 
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commoditization of this information, another scholar says that 
“information privacy is concerned with the use, transfer, and 
processing of the personal data generated in daily life.”31 
Data protection and privacy are concepts conjoined both in 
theory and in practical application.32  The interrelatedness is that: 
Security involves the protection of information, 
applications and operating systems, networks, and 
hardware and supporting equipment.  If networks can be 
breached, information can be accessed; if applications or 
operating systems can be manipulated, data can be 
sabotaged or compromised; if information controls can be 
broken, then information can be stolen, disclosed, or 
compromised.  In part, security is about protecting 
information from loss, misuse, unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration, and destruction.33 
The ChoicePoint breach, disclosed in February 2005,34 was a 
tipping point in the discussion of privacy and the revelation of data 
breaches, perhaps because it was of such great magnitude or 
perhaps because it involved criminals barely posing as legitimate 
data purchasers.35  Since February 14, 2005, the date of the 
ChoicePoint disclosure, more than 100 million records containing 
the personal information of U.S. residents have been 
“compromised.”36  Nearly 19 million U.S. households had some 
theft of personal information in 2006, in an estimated 303 
incidents.37  Additionally, ChoicePoint alerted the public to the 
massive and growing data broker business, and to the associated 
data transfers about consumers and their behavior which these 
 
 31 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 
2058 (2004). 
 32 INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 136. 
 33 Id. at 136. 
 34 The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Keeps a Tally of the Breaches Since ChoicePoint, 
available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm. 
 35 See infra Part II. 
 36 The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 37 The Identity Theft Resource Center, 2006 Disclosure of U.S. Data Incidents, 
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/breaches.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
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companies seek and store.38  One of the Acxiom profiler tools is 
estimated to have collected information from at least 15 million 
sources, covering 95 percent of American households; Experian 
claims to cover 98 percent of households, with potentially more 
than 1000 data points of information on each household.39  And not 
only major businesses have access to their lists of households, as 
the price points for such data are low, as inexpensive as $65 per 
1000 names.40 
Surveys of Americans and of online consumers emphasize their 
concerns about the use of their information.41  “Information 
sharing and collection have been going on for a long time, but I 
think consumers are finally starting to get some awareness and 
they do not like it,” a Federal Trade Commission attorney 
presciently told a privacy panel at the University of Maine in the 
summer of 2001.42  The notion that, even without explicit laws 
regarding their data, responsible companies should treat 
information with care is steadily emerging, indeed, “[t]here are 
instances where there are no laws or regulations regarding the 
privacy or security of certain information; however, there is a 
public perception that disclosure of this type of data is not 
acceptable.”43 
D. Enforcement by Everyone 
Data breaches and subsequent data theft or illegitimate use are 
covered by a haphazard series of state laws, as well as enforcement 
actions by Attorneys General and federal administrative agencies, 
especially the Federal Trade Commission.  But the recent story of 
data security breaches in the United States is a bit of a chicken-
and-egg situation.  Many of the large-scale breaches which have 
 
 38 See infra Part II. 
 39 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65–66 (2003). 
 40 Richards, supra note 10, at 1157–58. 
 41 See Rita Heimes, Internet Privacy Law, Policy, and Practice: State, Federal, and 
International Perspectives, 54 ME. L. REV. 95 (2002). 
 42 Id. at 103 (reporting a panel discussion that took place June 7–8, 2001 and quoting 
Laura Mazzarella, attorney in the Division of Financial Practices of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
 43 See INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 156. 
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come to the attention of the press and the public—including the 
ChoicePoint incident—may be credited to legislation out of 
California requiring the notification of California residents whose 
personal information is breached.44  Of course, breaches large and 
small occurred before the California legislation went into effect, 
and it is likely that some companies have made the decision to take 
the business risk of violating the California law—or more subtly 
deciding an incident did not cause the notification requirement to 
kick in—than risk the questions from those whose information was 
revealed who live outside of California, from regulators, 
stockholders; the dip in stock prices; the loss of customers and 
clients; and the surrounding publicity.45  Estimates do suggest that 
the number of security breaches is increasing; security breaches are 
estimated to have occurred at between 80 and 90 percent of 
Fortune 500 companies and government agencies.46 
E. In the States 
California was the first state to pass significant online breach 
notification legislation, and, though the law has been criticized for 
ambiguous drafting and other elements considered 
disadvantageous (especially to non-California-based companies), it 
is nevertheless setting the standard by which subsequent state 
legislation is being drafted.47  The California data breach 
notification law was only one of several significant pieces of 
online- or privacy-oriented consumer protection to come out of 
that state’s legislature recently,48 and was the reaction to the 
 
 44 See Tyler Paetkau & Roxanne Torabian-Bashardoust, California Deals with Id Theft: 
The Promise and the Problems, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 2004, at 37. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Alexander Frid & Jeffrey M. Rawitz, Jones Day Commentaries: Security Breach 
Notification Requirements: Guidelines and Securities Law Considerations (2006), 
available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S3225 (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2007). 
 47 See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82 (2006).  For criticisms, see Paetkau & 
Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 44. 
 48 The breadth of California legislation is dizzying, covering the transfer of information 
to direct marketers, the publication of cell phone numbers in a directory, the use of Social 
Security numbers on paychecks, the downloading of spyware, using medical information 
about individuals to market to them, the use of data from GPS systems in rental cars, 
among others.  Though some of the other California legislation does touch on data 
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hacking of a website that could have exposed all of the state’s 
employees’ Social Security numbers.49  The hacker attack, which 
involved data about more than 225,000 employees, was discovered 
in early May.50 However, the individuals whose data was 
compromised—and who included state legislators—were not 
notified for several weeks.51  California, which shares the dubious 
distinction with Washington, D.C., as the two places where the 
most identity theft crimes take place,52 is traditionally very 
protective of consumers, as well as the home of cutting-edge 
technology legislation.53  In a nod to the fact that not all data is 
held in electronic format, the legislature has considered expanding 
the statute to include non-electronic data.54 
1. California 
The California law, the Security Breach Information Act, was 
drafted, passed, and signed by Governor Gray Davis within four 
months.55  The law, which went into effect July 1, 2003, defines 
the personal information at issue as a person’s first name (or first 
initial) and last name in combination with either the person’s 
Social Security number; driver’s license number or California 
 
privacy and information security, this piece focuses on the issue of breaches, and as such 
is concerned only with CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29 and 1798.82.  For the other 
legislation, see David Bender, Privacy Developments-2005, 11th Annual Institute on 
Intellectual Property Law, 842 PLI/PAT 9 (2005) [hereinafter Bender, Privacy 
Developments]; Barbara L. Delaney et al., California Privacy and Security Legislation 
Affects Entire Nation, 3 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21 (2005); Chad C. Coombs & 
Keenen Milner, New California Identity Theft Legislation, L.A. LAWYER 21 (2004); 
Paetkau & Torabian-Bashardoust, supra note 44. 
 49 See Robert Lemos, ‘Perfect Storm’ for New Privacy Laws?, CNETNEWS.COM, Mar. 
1, 2005, available at http://news.com.com/Perfect+storm+for+new+privacy+laws/2100-
1029_3-5593225.html. 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 Coombs & Milner, supra note 48, at 21. 
 53 See generally Delaney et al., supra note 48. 
 54 Kenneth M. Dreifach, Data Privacy, Web Security, and Attorney General 
Enforcement, 6th Annual Institute on Privacy Law: Data Protection—The Convergence 
of Privacy & Security, 828 PLI/PAT 401, 420. 
 55 Lemos, supra note 49.  For more of the history of the passage of the California, see 
Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First 
State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft 
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14–39 (2003). 
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Identification Card number; account number; credit or debit card 
number, in combination with any code that would permit access to 
a financial account and that isn’t available to the general public 
from government records.56  It is not necessary that both elements 
be unencrypted; either an unencrypted name or data would trigger 
the statute.57  The definition of a breach is one of the elements that 
is controversial—the “unencrypted personal information was, or is 
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized 
person[,]”58 without regard for whether the information was 
actually used.  The California law applies to both private and 
governmental entities.59  It additionally allows for a private civil 
action by anyone harmed by a breach, and the law places no limits 
on other claims under unfair business practices or 
misrepresentation (regarding the privacy policies in place, for 
example).60 
The California law also specifies how a company must alert 
customers of the breach, and, in one of the most criticized aspects 
of the law, an ambiguously drafted statement of how quickly the 
notification must take place.61  The disclosure must take place 
within “most expedient time possible and without unreasonable 
delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law enforcement[.]”62  
Notice must be written; or electronic in accordance with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7001 (concerning electronic records and signatures); or may be a 
sort of substitute notice, if the cost of notice exceeds $250,000 or 
that the number of people who must be notified is more than 
500,000 or if their contact information is incomplete.63  Substitute 
notice requires email for those the entity has email for; 
“[c]onspicuous posting of the notice on the agency’s Web site 
page, if the agency maintains one”; and “[n]otification to major 
 
 56 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)–(f) (2006). 
 57 Id. § 1798.29(e). 
 58 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (2006). 
 59 Id. § 1798.29 (applying to any person or business); id. § 1798.82 (applying to any 
California state agency); see also Dreifach, supra note 54, at 419. 
 60 Cheryl A. Falvey et al., Disclosure of Security Breaches Required by New California 
Privacy Legislation, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Aug. 2003, at 5. 
 61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2006). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. § 1798.29(g). 
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statewide media.”64  If the breaching entity has an “information 
security policy” that states how and how quickly it will notify 
customers of a breach, and that policy is not in conflict with the 
California law, following that policy will suffice as complying 
with the timely notification aspects of the statute.65 
2. Florida 
In a tale that is indicative of the conflict of openness of records 
and the call for increasing privacy, Florida government officials 
find themselves struggling to follow two seemingly contradictory 
pieces of legislation—one which requires county recorders to make 
available online a wide variety of public records, and another (set 
to be enforced as of January 1, 2008, a deadline that has been 
extended twice66) that limits the personal information placed 
online.67  The old law meant that Social Security numbers, birth 
dates, driver’s license information, passport numbers, green card 
information, images of signatures, and bank account numbers of 
current and former Florida residents were to be put online if they 
were part of a public record, making the owners of the information 
extremely vulnerable to identity theft; the new law mandates the 
removal of “Social Security numbers, bank account numbers, and 
credit and debit card numbers” from online public records.68  The 
issue initially rose in Broward County in the spring of 2006, but 
the data in question has been online since 1999, according to that 
county’s director of records, who claims that the Broward exposure 
is repeated around the country as local governments followed 
policies to allow internet access to public records.69 
Florida has another law that addresses the data security of 
individuals under the criminal code, and is a useful contrast to the 
 
 64 Id. § 1798.29(g)(3). 
 65 Id. § 1798.29(h). 
 66 Monica Hatcher, Public Records Easy Targets for ID Thieves, MIAMI HERALD, 
Aug. 27, 2006, at A1. 
 67 Jaikumar Vijayan, Update: Fla. Residents’ Data Exposure a Statewide Issue, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 11, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/ 
security/privacy/story/0,10801,110389,00.html. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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California law.70  Passed after the ChoicePoint breach, the 
amendments to the “Criminal Use of Personal Identification 
Information” statute went into effect July 1, 2005,71 and prescribe 
criminal penalties for misusing others’ information,72 including 
that of dead people.73  The Florida statute focuses on the criminal 
aspect of data breaches, with the misuse quickly becoming a 
felony.74 
Florida requires that the victim “whose unencrypted personal 
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired 
by an unauthorized person,” be notified “without unreasonable 
delay . . . [usually] no later than 45 days following the 
determination of the breach.”75  A company’s failure to notify may 
invoke a fine of up to $500,000 per breach,76 but the statute 
exempts governmental agencies unless they have contracted with a 
third-party to provide “governmental services,” in which case the 
third-party can be liable for the fine without the ability to bill back 
to the governmental agency.77  For third parties holding data for 
businesses, breaches must be reported within ten days, or penalties 
start to kick in.78  In Florida, “breach” means “unlawful and 
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that materially 
compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal 
information.”79  Victim notification provisions are very similar to 
those in the California law,80 with law enforcement81 and data 
protection policy carve-outs.82  But unlike California, if the data of 
more than 1000 people is involved in a breach, the company must 
notify “all consumer reporting agencies that compile and maintain 
 
 70 Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.568 (2005), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e). 
 71 H.R. 481, 2005 Leg., 107th Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2005). 
 72 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.568(2) (2005). 
 73 FLA. STAT. § 817.568(8)(a) (2005). 
 74 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(2). 
 75 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(a) (2005). 
 76 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(b) (2005). 
 77 See FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(d). 
 78 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(2)(a). 
 79 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(4). 
 80 Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(6), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(g) (2006). 
 81 Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(3), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(c) (2006). 
 82 Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(9), with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(h) (2006). 
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files on consumers on a nationwide basis.”83  There is also the 
addition of a clause that “notification is not required if, after an 
appropriate investigation or after consultation with relevant 
federal, state, and local agencies responsible for law enforcement, 
the person reasonably determines that the breach has not and will 
not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal 
information has been acquired and accessed.”84 
3. Other State Laws 
The California and Florida laws are now just two among the 
many laws in an increasing list.  As of July 2006, state security 
breach laws were in effect in at least thirty-three states: Arkansas, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia (covers data brokers only), Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana 
(covers state agencies only), Kansas (took effect Jan. 1, 2007), 
Louisiana, Maine (applies to information brokers only), Minnesota 
(law does not apply to financial institutions or HIPAA-covered 
institutions), Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire (took 
effect Jan. 1, 2007), New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma (covers state agencies only), 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island (does not include HIPAA-covered 
institutions), Tennessee, Texas, Utah (took effect Jan. 1, 2007), 
Washington, and Wisconsin.85  An additional protection for the 
individual is the ability to act on the information that one’s identity 
could be endangered.  By summer 2006, according to the Public 
Interest Research Group, twenty-five states had legislation that 
allows or would be in force to allow consumers to place security 
freezes on their credit reports.86  Five of those states require that 
the consumer be a victim of identity theft (Hawaii, Kansas, South 
Dakota, Texas and Washington, with Washington including 
 
 83 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12). 
 84 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(10)(a) (emphasis added).  “Such a determination must be 
documented in writing and the documentation must be maintained for 5 years.” Id. 
 85 See State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Security Breach Notification 
Laws, http://pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007) 
(maintaining a relatively up-to-date list of the status of state legislation on security breach 
notification and freeze laws and links to most of the state legislation). 
 86 Id. 
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consumers who have received notice of a breach).87  The other 
twenty states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin.88  This is 
an increase over the twelve states that had laws in place that let 
consumers restrict access to credit reports as of January 2006, and 
up from four states with security freeze laws in place as of January 
2005.89 
Factors that differentiate the state laws include: whether the 
breach victim must be notified in all cases or only in the case of 
risk of some level or of actual harm;90 if a credit-reporting agency 
must also be notified, and if so at what threshold of records;91 what 
constitutes personal information covered by the law (and whether 
it must be electronic in format);92 whether there is an individual 
right of action or if the state Attorney General’s office or another 
governmental entity must act;93 who must comply with the law (for 
instance, must governmental agencies comply at the same level as 
private enterprise, does the storage with a third party change the 
application of the breach notification, who is the target of the 
notification, etc.);94 whether the law addresses civil or criminal 
repercussions;95 what opt-outs for federally covered information 
exist (such as the Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) or the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA));96 if there is an associated ability to freeze access to 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12). 
 92 DOUG MARKIEWICZ, VIGILANTMINDS, STATE SECURITY BREACH LEGISLATION 4–5 
(2006), http://www.vigilantminds.com/files/vigilantminds_state_security_breach_legisla 
tion_whitepaper.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007). 
 93 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(11). 
 94 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(10)(c). 
 95 Compare FLA. STAT. § 817.568 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing criminal penalties), 
with FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (providing administrative fines). 
 96 See State PIRG Summary of State Security Freeze and Security Breach Notification 
Laws, http://pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2007); see also 
Kaustuv M. Das, Data Breach Notification Laws: The Changing Landscape in Early 
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credit reports (this is often found in separate statute, but also has 
several variants, such as whether the individual must have had 
their identity stolen before the freeze can take place or if the freeze 
may be prophylactic);97 how much and what sorts of effort must be 
made to notify those whose information is breached;98 and how 
quickly that notification must take place.99  Additionally, some of 
the legislation interacts with old state statutes on unfair 
competition.100  It is also unclear how state laws will interact with 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act and parts of the GLBA.101 
The requirement of some level of risk of use of the information 
is not present in the California law, meaning that the breach 
without any level of harm or risk of harm is in and of itself 
actionable, and this is one of the elements that makes it one of the 
toughest state laws.102  Levels of risk of use of the data required for 
the statutes to kick in vary among the states, with no requirement 
at all of any consideration of harm, to “reasonable” or even 
“significant” risk and harm, injury, or loss all being among the 
issues considered.103  Notification speed is generally vague, with 
the exception of Florida and Ohio, which require notification 
within forty-five days and New York, which specifies that state 
agencies must notify potential victims within 120 days.104 
The definition of personal information105 also varies widely 
(mother’s maiden name, for instance, is personal information 
 
2006, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE ADVISORY BULLETIN, Mar. 2006, available at 
http://www.dwt.com/practc/privacy/bulletins/03-06_DataBreach.htm.. 
 97 See id. 
 98 See MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at 5–6. 
 99 Id. at 6–7, Table 1 (comparing some of these and other attributes of the state laws). 
 100 See Das, supra note 96. 
 101 See Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 380.  “Most privacy 
protections in America have been created by state legislatures.” Id. at 381.  Solove and 
Hoofnagle suggest that federal privacy legislation should focus on “‘floor preemption,’ 
thereby allowing states to innovate more comprehensive protections for individual 
rights.” Id. 
 102 See Patti Waldmeir, Federal data security law reaches turning point in Congress, 
FT.COM, Apr. 13, 2006, available at  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/49315c58-ca6b-11da-
852f-0000779e2340.html.  
 103 MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Table 1; see also Das, supra note 100. 
 104 MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Table 1; see also Das, supra note 100. 
 105 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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according to laws in North Carolina and North Dakota106), as does 
the requirements for the information’s encryption, with some state 
laws including a “encrypted data safe harbor” for data that is safely 
encrypted.107  In California, the statute comes into play only when 
the data is not encrypted, but other statutes require notification if 
the encryption is broken or the encryption key compromised.108 
Who owns enforcement and administration varies, too; the 
Florida Department of Legal Affairs collects fines and institutes 
proceedings for the civil penalties, while the criminal penalties are 
handled by that state’s criminal division.109 
F. Congress to the Rescue? 
After ChoicePoint, it appeared that Congress might act fast to 
pass federal data breach notification legislation, but the topic has 
been mired by a variety of different approaches—reflecting the 
variety of approaches by the states.110  Legislation has been 
proposed and publicized by high-profile lawmakers, among them 
California Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Vermont Democratic 
Sen. Patrick Leahy, and Pennsylvania Republican Sen. Arlen 
Specter.111  Feinstein’s bill is very similar to the California law, 
and interacts with existing state laws by serving as a floor, 
allowing the states to go above her proposed legislation, and 
explicitly allows for the Federal Trade Commission to impose civil 
remedies.112 
At least eighteen bills have been introduced in House and 
Senate committees, but the issues raised by proposed legislation 
are difficult, and influential lobbies have vested interests in the 
outcomes (banking and financial concerns among them).113  For 
example, allowing consumers to freeze access to their credit 
reports is proving controversial.  In March 2006, the House 
 
 106 MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at Tbl. 1. 
 107 Id. 
 108 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(a) (2006); MARKIEWICZ, supra note 92, at tbl.1 n.8. 
 109 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(11) (2005). 
 110 See Das, supra note 100. 
 111 See Lemos, supra note 49. 
 112 See Skinner, supra note 55, at 62. 
 113 See Waldmeir, supra note 102; Das, supra note 100. 
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Financial Services Committee passed a bill with a credit freeze 
provision; several members who voted for the bill in committee 
said they would need to revisit that aspect if it went before a full 
House vote.114  On the federal level, the already-complicated 
elements considered by the state legislation above take on even 
more dimensions.  Other controversial issues include how a federal 
law would interact with the existing federal laws, chief among 
them the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA).115 
In what may be the best chance for federal legislation, in 
February 2007, Leahy and Sen. Bernie Sanders, an Independent 
from Vermont, introduced The Personal Data Privacy and Security 
Act of 2007, a bill similar to one Specter and Leahy sponsored in 
2005.116  The first version was considered by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, but “languished on the Senate calendar for more than a 
year.”117  The 2007 bill as proposed has notice provisions, provides 
for criminal recourse for improper access to “sensitive personally 
identifiable information” (by amending the computer fraud statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(2)), and allows consumers to request from 
data brokers the information on file, and to correct any 
inaccuracies.118 
The proposed bill has carve-outs for information covered by 
GLBA and HIPAA, for law enforcement need, for fraud-
prevention technologies, and for marketing data.119  Companies 
holding information on more than 100,000 Americans would be 
required to have data privacy and security programs.120  Notice is 
required when the risk of harm is “significant,” and there are 
criminal penalties for intentionally concealing a breach that would 
 
 114 See Stacy Kaper & Rob Blackwell, Data Bill Moves Along, And So Does Freeze 
Fight, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 17, 2006, at 1. 
 115 See Das, supra note 96. 
 116 Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee On The Judiciary, On 
The Introduction Of The Leahy-Specter Personal Data Privacy And Security Act Of 
2007, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200702/020607.html (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
 117 Id. 
 118 The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/pdsa2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2007). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
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require notice.  In an interesting and gentle nod to data brokers, the 
bill asserts that “[d]ata brokers have assumed a significant role in 
providing information, authentication, and screening services, and 
related data collection and analyses for commercial, nonprofit, and 
government operations.”121 
The bill limits “[s]ensitive personally identifiable information” 
to “electronic or digital form.”122 “Sensitive personally identifiable 
information” is defined as first name or first initial and last name 
with any one of “Social Security number, driver’s license number, 
passport number, or alien registration number” or with two of  
“home address or telephone number; mother’s maiden name, if 
identified as such; month, day, and year of birth.”123  Additionally, 
“biometric data such as a finger print, voice print, a retina or iris 
image, or any other unique physical representation,” any account 
number and associated code or password that can be used to obtain 
anything of value, or a financial account number and any code 
needed to get funds or credit also constitute “[s]ensitive personally 
identifiable information.”124 
Another option to use federal law to address the issues of 
privacy would be to strengthen existing legislation, such as 
addressing some of the opt-outs in the GLBA.125  Possible opt-outs 
that could be limited include the exemptions from notification 
about information sharing that results from customer requests, or 
account maintenance, or when the sharing is among the financial 
institution’s affiliates or partners with whom it has agreements in 
place.126  Including data brokers such as Acxiom, Experian and 
ChoicePoint under the purview of the GLBA is another option, as 
the data broker industry is largely unregulated. 
Commentators and privacy experts alike worry that notification 
may have the opposite effect from that intended: the 
desensitization of consumers.  “[O]ver-notification anaesthetizes 
people because they feel, this happens all the time, and I didn’t get 
 
 121 Id. § 2, Findings. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Ireland & Howell, supra note 9, at 681–82. 
 126 Id. 
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hurt by it,” said a senior executive at data security firm RSA 
Security, which is advocating federal legislation.127  Acxiom’s 
chief privacy officer, Jennifer Barrett, who supports a notification 
bill based on a risk of identity theft, shares the concern.128  “It’s 
called a cry wolf syndrome,” she said in 2005.  “Cry wolf too 
many times and people won’t listen.”129 
II. BREACHES 
A look at some of the major security breaches from the past 
few years serves to highlight both the existing remedies that are 
being utilized and the room for improvement and experimentation.  
This discussion is by no means exhaustive, and suffers from 
inconsistent news reporting on criminal trials and a lack of access 
to lower court decisions and actual charges brought.  Companies 
and institutions—especially publicly traded ones, or ones reliant on 
the public’s trust—who have experienced a breach and are 
working with law enforcement have, despite the growing number 
of data breach notification laws, incentives to reduce the attention 
on the breach, the questions it raises about their data policies, and 
the extent to which customer, client, or student information has 
been exposed.  This section will categorize personal information 
data breaches, offering illustrations of each category: negligence, 
crime, low standards, and loss of control.  An attempt to establish a 
taxonomy of breaches is important in assuring that emerging 
legislative, administrative, and industry rules are properly covering 
the breadth of the issues.  Additionally, it is important to note that 
in many cases there is a duality of the approach to punish both the 
data attacker and the company that allowed the attack, as 
illustrated in the Amy Boyer and ChoicePoint cases. 
 
 127 Waldmeir, supra note 102. 
 128 Chip Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know Opinion of Privacy Proposals, ARK. 
BUS., Apr. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 8154023 [hereinafter Taulbee, Acxiom 
Lets Congress Know]. 
 129 Id. 
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A. Negligence: Data Brokers Have a Duty of Care 
Highlighting much of the consumer discomfort about what 
information data brokers hold, how they hold it, and where they 
got it from is a 1999 case from New Hampshire.130  Liam Youens 
was obsessed with a former high school classmate, Amy Boyer, 
and kept a log on a website of his efforts to find her so he could 
kill her.131  He knew her address, but not where she worked, so he 
turned to the information broker Docusearch.com.132  “It’s accually 
[sic] obsene [sic] what you can find out about a person on the 
internet,” he wrote on his website.133  Docusearch had 
subcontractors working for the company, and provided one of 
them, Michele Gambino, with Boyer’s Social Security number and 
more.  Gambino called Boyer or her mother, and, posing as an 
insurance company employee with a refund for overpayment, got 
Boyer’s work address from her.134  This practice is called 
“pretexting,” and some forms of it were made illegal by the 
GLBA.135  For Boyer, it was too late; on October 15, Youens drove 
by as she was getting in her car to leave work and shot eleven 
bullets into her head and upper body before turning the gun on 
himself.136  Docusearch charged Youens $45 for Boyer’s Social 
Security number, and $109 for her work address.137  After Boyer’s 
murder, a New Hampshire Senator introduced “Amy Boyer’s 
Law,” which would limit the use of Social Security numbers.138  
Ironically, privacy advocates and industries attacked the 
legislation, which did not become law.139 
 
 130 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7952 (D.N.H. Apr. 25, 2002). 
 131 Securing Electronic Personal Data Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert Douglas, CEO of PrivacyToday.com). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id.  See also Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Amy Boyer Case, 
http://epic.org/privacy/boyer/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) (providing a background of the 
case and the relevant claims) [hereinafter The Amy Boyer Case]. 
 135 See 15 U.S.C. § 6821 (2006).  See also The Amy Boyer Case, supra note 134. 
 136 Testimony of Robert Douglas, supra note 131. 
 137 The Amy Boyer Case, supra note 134. 
 138 Lemos, supra note 49. 
 139 Id. 
GARCIA_FORMATTED_032707 3/27/2007  2:28:14 PM 
2007 DATA PROTECTION EXPERIMENTS 715 
The Boyer case is not the only situation in which data brokers 
have given out information to stalkers resulting in tragic 
consequences; actress Theresa Saldana was stabbed and slashed in 
March 1992 by a stalker who got her home address from a private 
investigator who called Saldana’s mother impersonating Martin 
Scorsese’s assistant, and claiming to be looking for Saldana to 
discuss a role.140 
In 1989, actress Rebecca Schaeffer was murdered by a stalker 
who got her home address from a private investigator using the 
California motor vehicles database.141  The Schaeffer case is 
credited with sparking the passage of the Drivers’ Privacy 
Protection Act.142  Prior to the passage of that law, states had made 
millions of dollars auctioning off their motor vehicle and driver’s 
license records.  Colorado earned about $4.4 million, Florida’s 
price was $33 million, and New York made $17 million in a 
year.143 
The Boyer case, however, was different from the Schaeffer 
incident in that Amy Boyer’s mother, on behalf of her estate, sued 
Docusearch and the subcontractor Gambino.  The New Hampshire 
Supreme Court said in February 2003 that data brokers and private 
investigators have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care if the 
information they sell about a person creates a risk, and that stalking 
and identity theft constitute foreseeable harms that would give rise 
to this duty.144  “This is especially true when, as in this case, the 
investigator does not know the client or the client’s purpose in 
seeking the information[,]” the court said.145 
In what EPIC called “a significant expansion of privacy 
protection” exceeding Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s provisions,146 the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court said that the state’s Consumer 
 
 140 Testimony of Robert Douglas, supra note 131. 
 141 Id. (noting that the Shaeffer murder led to the passage of the Drivers Privacy 
Protection Act). 
 142 Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 376. 
 143 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1150 (2002). 
 144 Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1004–05, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
 145 See id. at 1008. 
 146 EPIC Litigation Docket, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/litigation/ (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2007). 
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Protection Act allows a private cause of action by the individual 
who was deceived against a private investigator or information 
broker for damages caused by the sale of information obtained by a 
pretextual phone call.147  The court also said that getting an 
individual’s Social Security number from a credit reporting agency 
without the person’s knowledge or permission and selling it to a 
client may also provide a cause of action for damages.148 
B. Crime: ChoicePoint and Acxiom 
1. ChoicePoint 
Choicepoint is perhaps the world’s biggest data broker, holding 
19 billion records in its databases, many of which have come from 
smaller data brokers that it has bought during its first seven years 
in business.149  In its second significant breach, but the first to 
receive massive media attention, the commercial data aggregator 
ChoicePoint reported that 50 business clients to whom it had been 
selling data were not who they claimed but instead fraudulent 
entities set up entirely to collect data, and that the data the 
businesses received had been used in about 50 cases of identity 
theft.150  The first breach, in 2002, involved about $1 million of 
fraud “in the form of identity theft.”151 In the later breach, early 
reports put the number of consumers affected at 145,000, but the 
Federal Trade Commission said that the number reached more than 
160,000.152  A 2003 California law requiring the notification of 
 
 147 See Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1005, 1010–11. 
 148 See id. at 1004–05. 
 149 Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, 
at C1 [hereinafter Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws].  See also Bender, Privacy 
developments, supra note 48, at n.15.  This data includes “current and previous address, 
credit data, employment history, motor vehicle data, police data, assets, insurance claims, 
and professional license data.” 
 150 Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48; Tom Zeller Jr., U.S. Settles with 
Company on Leak of Consumers’ Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter 
Zeller, U.S. Settles].  A ChoicePoint official disagreed with the claims of 800 identity 
thefts, saying the number he was aware of was sixteen. Id. 
 151 Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48. 
 152 Zeller, U.S. Settles, supra note 150.  An additional 17,000 people were notified in 
November 2005 that their data was included. Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra 
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breaches by companies holding information on California residents 
is credited with bringing the breach to light.153  Initially, the 
company at first notified only the 35,000 California residents 
whose data might have been compromised; when questions arose 
about other state residents, the company was forced to reveal the 
breadth of the issue.154 
The ChoicePoint breach also brought to the public’s attention 
the data broker industry, and “invited a national debate.”155  
Indicative of the growing broker business, ChoicePoint numbers 
among its clients “insurance agencies and corporate employee 
screeners, check-cashing companies, media outlets . . . , private 
investigators, law enforcement officials and even the United States 
government” as well as offering inexpensive public records 
information to everyone.156  The data is used for background 
checks for employers, tenant and drug screenings, checking for 
mortgage fraud, and searching for shareholders.157 
The FTC fined the Alpharetta, Georgia, based ChoicePoint $10 
million and required the company to set aside a $5 million fund for 
consumer compensation.158  The FTC complaint said that 
ChoicePoint failed to notice “obvious red flags” in applications 
from the fraudulent businesses.159  Because the data included 
highly regulated credit history data, the company was potentially in 
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, though the FTC 
settlement is not an acknowledgement of any wrongdoing.160 
Other class-action suits have been filed in addition to the 
Goldberg class-action suit mentioned above.  In at least two of 
them, the would-be plaintiffs claim that ChoicePoint, which spun 
off from Equifax, was indeed a consumer reporting agency, and 
 
note 16, at 358 n.1 (citing Michael Hiltzik, Big Data Broker Eyes DMV Records, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2005, at C1). 
 153 Amanda Bronstad, ChoicePoint Case Highlights Evolution of Identity Theft, L.A. 
BUS. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at 6. 
 154 Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws, supra note 149. 
 155 See generally, Solove & Hoofnagle, Model Regime, supra note 16, at 368. 
 156 Zeller, Breach Points Up Flaws, supra note 149. 
 157 Bronstad, supra note 153. 
 158 Zeller, U.S. Settles, supra note 150. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
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hence should be governed by the federal and state laws that apply 
to that industry, especially the ones that require a company to be 
certain of the other entities to which it is selling data.161 
2. The Crimes behind ChoicePoint 
What took place in the ChoicePoint case was a modern version 
of the classic dumpster diving schemes, where thieves would look 
through garbage for information with which to open new credit 
lines.  Starting in March 2000, the brother-sister duo of Adedayo 
and Bibiana Benson opened a series of accounts with ChoicePoint, 
and used those accounts to get thousands of identifying numbers 
from ChoicePoint.162  The Bensons, as well as at least one other 
man, obtained credit data from ChoicePoint, after opening 
accounts using forged business documents.163 
The Bensons then opened credit and bank accounts, including 
cell phone accounts, using the names of the people ChoicePoint 
had released to them.164  They also resold the data to others.165  
Bibiana was charged in 2002, and her brother in late 2004; the 
cases ended in March 2005, and both are serving federal prison 
sentences of more than four years each.166 The other man, Olatunji 
Oluwatosin, was charged in August 2005 of operating similar 
schemes and was sentenced to ten years in prison and $6.5 million 
in restitution.167 Oluwatosin pleaded guilty to “conspiracy to 
commit computer access fraud and grand theft.”168 
ChoicePoint has been criticized for the delay in revealing the 
breach, as well as the fact that the company was giving data out 
based merely on the applicant having a business license; the 
company claims it has changed this practice and now has agents 
 
 161 Bond, supra note 2. 
 162 Bronstad, supra note 153. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Business Briefs: Identity Theft Results in a 10-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 11, 
2006, at C2. 
 168 Id.  There is mention of at least one more defendant in the case, an “Encino man,” 
but he is not named in news reports. See Brondstad, supra note 153. 
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visit businesses before the company reveals “sensitive personally 
identifiable information.”169 
There is an additional irony in this particular breach: 
ChoicePoint is only one among several commercial data brokers 
who work with the government and law enforcement agencies to 
aggregate data.170  But ChoicePoint’s breach raises many questions 
about the sorts of information and how much access government 
entities have to data stored at these brokers.171 
These issues, which include the security of the access to the 
databases, the protocols in place for the government employees 
who have access to the information—estimated to include tens of 
thousands of federal law enforcement agents172—and the breadth 
of the information itself, have been the subject of Electronic 
Privacy Information Center requests under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA).173  The FOIA requests include 
ChoicePoint, but also cover LexisNexis, Experian, Dun & 
Bradstreet, and Database Technologies Online.174  The requests 
have revealed that security measures in place tend to favor the 
protection of the agencies, not the individuals whose information 
the databases are housing.175 
3. Acxiom 
At Acxiom, one hacker led authorities to another, much more 
nefarious one.  Federal authorities said that Daniel Baas of 
Milford, Ohio, was just “hacking for kicks” when he intruded into 
the company’s systems and took millions of records on individuals, 
 
 169 Bronstad, supra note 153. 
 170 See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other 
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 
29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 599 (2004) [hereinafter Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s 
Little Helpers]. 
 171 See id. at 599–618. 
 172 Id. at 607. 
 173 See id. at 595–600.  See also http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (last visited 
Jan. 8, 2007) for the documents which have been released and for the status of the 
pending requests. 
 174 Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers, supra note 170, at 599. 
 175 Id. at 610. 
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which he stored on disks he kept at his home.176  Baas was working 
as a systems administrator for one of Acxiom’s clients, 
Cincinnati’s Market Intelligence Group, when he downloaded 
about 300 passwords, including an administrative one, and 
accessed data from other Acxiom customers from December 2002 
to January 2003.177  In March 2005, Baas started serving a forty-
five month federal prison sentence for the intrusions, which were 
estimated to cost Acxiom $5.8 million.178 
But in the discovery for their prosecution of Baas, investigators 
found a trail left by Scott Levine, whose theft of more than one 
billion  records eclipsed Baas’ activities.179  From about January 
through July 2003, Levine got access to an Acxiom server by using 
what the Department of Justice called “sophisticated decryption 
software” to illegally obtain passwords.180 
Levine who is alternatively described as an “online 
advertiser”181 and the owner of a “corporation engaged in the 
business of distributing advertisements over the Internet to email 
addresses[,]”182 had a previous run-in with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which alleged he sold unregistered 
securities targeted at Florida’s senior citizens.183  At the time of the 
Acxiom breach, Levine was the owner of Boca Raton, Florida-
based Snipermail.com, a bulk emailer.184  One news report said 
that his initial access came from a client Snipermail and Acxiom 
had in common who gave his company the FTP password.185  
 
 176 Acxiom Case Sends Message (Commentary), ARK. BUS., Feb. 27, 2006 [hereinafter 
Acxiom Case Sends Message]; Chip Taulbee, Trial To Rehash Acxiom’s, Hackers Past, 
ARK. BUS., July 11, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 12588914 [hereinafter Taulbee, Trial 
To Rehash]. 
 177 Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176. 
 178 Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176; Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know, 
supra note 128. 
 179 Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176.  See also Press Release, Dep’t of Just., 
Former Officer of Internet Company Sentenced in Case of Massive Data Theft from 
Acxiom Corporation (Feb. 22, 2006), 06-088, available at 2006 WL 416250 [hereinafter 
Press Release, Dep’t of Just.]. 
 180 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179. 
 181 Acxiom Case Sends Message, supra note 176. 
 182 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179. 
 183 Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
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Using that password, he and other Snipermail employees were able 
to access other files from other Acxiom clients, and then ran 
programs to decrypt other usernames and passwords.186  In the end, 
Levine and Snipermail stole more than eight gigabytes of 
information, some of which was resold to other Snipermail client 
“spammers[,]” making his entry a peer among the larger known 
intrusions.187 
Levine’s download and subsequent resale of those records led 
to his conviction in an August 2005 jury trial on “120 counts of 
unauthorized access of a protected computer, two counts of access 
device fraud, and one count of obstruction of justice,” for which he 
was sentenced to ninety-six months in federal prison.188  Acxiom 
estimated that the Levine intrusion cost the company at least 
$7 million.189  Acxiom’s data security methodologies were also 
criticized widely after the breach and the stock price suffered.190 
In 2005 testimony in front of a Congressional committee 
considering federal privacy regulation, Acxiom’s privacy officer 
said that none of the files accessed in either breach resulted in 
identity theft.191  The Acxiom official line supports a federal 
privacy legislation that prevents state action on the issue, but only 
one that limits notification to situations where there is a real 
chance that identity theft will ensue.192 
The Wall Street Journal reported that Acxiom’s initial 
interpretation of the California breach notification law made the 
company responsible only for notification of its clients—the 
retailers for whom it manages databases—and not the California 
consumers.193  The company’s logic, which was criticized by 
privacy advocates, was that the data belonged to the retailers.194 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., supra note 179. 
 189 See Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know, supra note 128. 
 190 See Taulbee, Trial To Rehash, supra note 176. 
 191 See Taulbee, Acxiom Lets Congress Know, supra note 128. 
 192 See id. 
 193 Dionne Searcey, Information Security; Consumer Alert: In 2003, California Passed 
Its Security Breach Notice Law; Its Effect Has Extended Well Beyond the State, WALL 
ST. J., July 18, 2005, at R6. 
 194 See id. 
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C. Low Standards: Other Lax Security Practices 
The Federal Trade Commission has filed at least nine actions 
against companies whose security practices resulted in 
compromised customer data.  At least one of them was a complaint 
about the company’s information security policies; many of the 
others, including complaints against Gateway Learning Corp. 
(2004), Eli Lily (2002), Microsoft (2002), and Guess? (2003), were 
based on allegations that the company did not do what the privacy 
policy promised that it was doing to protect customer 
information.195 
Eliot Spitzer, New York’s Attorney General at the time, 
reached an agreement with the online arm of lingerie retailer 
Victoria’s Secret, where the retailer agreed to a fine of $50,000 for 
exposing the orders, names, and addresses of more than 560 
customers.196  “The consumer protection laws of the 1930’s have 
become the privacy law of the 21st century,” Spitzer told the New 
York Times.197 
D. Loss of Control: Lost and Stolen 
Stolen laptops comprise another—and seemingly endlessly 
reported—category of data breaches.  Wells Fargo, Motorola, 
MCI, a large number of universities, blood banks, and medical 
centers have reported losses.198  Backup tapes went missing from 
Time Warner, the Bank of America, and Ameritrade, among 
others. 199  The scorecard is not comforting and does not reflect 
learning from prior events.  The University of Colorado had four 
instances of lost tapes in 2005; Michigan State University had 
three.200 
 
 195 See Dreifach, supra note 54, at 417. 
 196 See John Schwartz, Victoria’s Secret Reaches a Data Privacy Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2003, at C14. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See Bender, Privacy Developments, supra note 48, at 15. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Identity Theft Resource Center Reports 104 Security Breaches Since January 1st 
Is Anyone Hearing An Alarm Bell Yet?, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 6, 2005. 
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E. Two Additional Considerations 
1. Is Harm Necessary? 
Harm is a troublesome element in looking at the privacy 
legislation put forth by the states.201  At least one commentator 
says that the role of harm—or the requirement of particular types 
or levels of harm—is far from settled in private claims regarding 
privacy violations.202  As an example, he cites the case of a local 
pharmacy that was sold to the CVS chain, which required as a 
condition of the sale that pharmacy records be transferred and that 
customers not be notified until after the sale.203  As a result, a 
class-action suit was filed against the pharmacies.204  The plaintiff, 
an AIDS patient, claimed he used the independent pharmacy for 
almost twenty years precisely because he expected his information 
to be handled confidentially.  The court said that, although “actual 
injury” is required by the New York General Business law in play, 
that injury did not need to be “pecuniary,” apparently accepting the 
plaintiff’s assertion that the loss of the right to privacy was an 
adequate harm, one that was lost as a result of the intentional 
practices of CVS.205 
2. Mixed Messages from Washington 
Meanwhile, at the same time that Congress and state 
lawmakers are seeking to protect consumers with more legislation 
at both levels, other governmental actors are moving in the 
opposite direction.  In two stark examples of the amount and 
variety of information held on consumers, changes to IRS and 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
enforcement appear to be on the horizon.  The IRS has quietly 
revealed that it is considering allowing tax preparers to sell 
 
 201 See supra Part I.E. 
 202 Dreifach, supra note 54, at 416. 
 203 Id. (discussing Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 188 Misc. 2d 616 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)). 
 204 CVS, 188 Misc. 2d at 616. 
 205 Id. at 624.  “To plead a claim for violation of General Business Law § 349, a plaintiff 
must allege that (1) defendant’s acts have broad impact on consumers at large; 
(2) defendant is engaged in deceptive practices; and (3) this practice has injured 
plaintiff[.]” Id. 
GARCIA_FORMATTED_032707 3/27/2007  2:28:14 PM 
724 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. XVII 
information gathered from tax returns.206  In response, however, 
forty-six Attorneys General from the states and the District of 
Columbia have submitted formal opposition to the change, instead 
suggesting a ban on the sharing of taxpayer information.207  In the 
summer of 2005, HIPAA rule-making changes were announced 
that reduced the criminal liability of individual employees in 
doctor’s offices.208  In March 2006, the House Financial Services 
Committee passed the Financial Data Protection Act, which, if 
enacted, would reduce the level of consumer protection in state 
laws.209 
 
 206 Jeff Gelles, IRS Plans to Allow Preparers To Sell Data, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 21, 
2006, at A01, available at 2006 WLNR 4628551. 
 207 Federal, State Officials Object to Proposed IRS Rules, EPIC ALERT, Vol. 13.07, 
Apr. 6, 2006, available at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_13.07.html.  EPIC has 
been critical of the IRS and its security, as is a broader Government Accountability 
Office report released in April 2006 that gave many federal agencies poor reports. Id.  
Security problems include: 
IRS’s physical security controls (restricting physical access to computer 
facilities and resources); software patch management; and electronic access 
controls such as passwords, user rights and file permissions.  The IRS also has 
had considerable trouble with its contractors improperly accessing and 
collecting sensitive taxpayer data.  In one case, an IRS contractor spent several 
months collecting political party affiliation data on taxpayers in 20 states, in 
violation of the law. Id. 
 208 See Amy Snow Landa, HIPAA Memo Could Affect Doctors’ Criminal Liability, 
AMERCIAN MEDICAL NEWS, Jul. 18, 2005, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2005/07/18/gvsb0718.htm (referencing to Memorandum from 
Timothy J.Coleman, Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General to Alex M. Aza II, 
General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Re: Scope of Criminal 
Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, June 1, 2005, available at 
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/hipaa_opinion_06_01_2005.pdf ); see also David 
V. Marshall, Justice Department Limits Prosecution Under HIPAA, Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP Advisory Bulletin, http://www.dwt.com/practc/hc_ecom/bulletins/06-29-
05_ProsecutionLimits.htm, (referencing Memorandum from Timothy J. Coleman, Senior 
Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General to Alex M. Aza II, General Counsel, Department 
of Health and Human Services, Re: Scope of Criminal Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320d-6, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/hipaa_ 
opinion_06_01_2005.pdf). 
 209 House Committee Approves Bill to Weaken Data Breach Laws, EPIC ALERT, 
Vol. 13.06, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_ 
13.06.html.  H.R. 3997 is just one of the data security bills under consideration, some 
stronger and some weaker than the state laws. 
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III. THE TOOLS ARE MANY 
The examples mentioned above invoke tort and due care 
considerations; state consumer protection legislation; 
administrative actions by the FTC; class action lawsuits, including 
one where no tangible harm has been suffered; computer fraud 
statutes; grand theft charges; the Freedom of Information Act; 
unauthorized access statutes; access device fraud; and obstruction 
of justice charges.  These are all real tools used by prosecutors and 
other governmental agents, privacy advocates, consumer groups, 
and individuals whose data has been compromised.  These tools 
are separately imperfect, but together comprise a net that needs 
further investigation and testing before an overarching federal law 
can provide safety for consumer information. 
Additional theoretical approaches are mentioned in the 
literature.  Tort theories that can be available to victims include 
trespass to chattels, conversion, and intrusion.210  Several 
commentators support a response based in a tort of privacy.211  
There is an increasing movement toward the recognition of a duty 
to protect information, with scholars suggesting the utilization of a 
variety of existing remedies in tort law and in traditional business 
law for those who fail to exercise proper care, in addition to the 
existing federal and state laws.212  One commentator says that if we 
do not already expect two new duties from companies, they soon 
will be expected to fulfill even more explicitly duties “to provide 
reasonable security for their corporate data and information 
systems; and . . . to disclose security breaches to those who may be 
adversely affected by such breaches.”213  Another commentator 
warns of liability for directors whose companies fail to ensure 
customer and employee privacy as a possible violation of the 
 
 210 Johnson, supra note 8, at 259. 
 211 See generally McClurg, supra note 39 (suggesting that the privacy tort of 
appropriation should be available as a remedy in situations of “invasive consumer data 
profiling”). 
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business judgment rule and the subsequent basis for shareholders’ 
derivative suits.214 
IV. CONCLUSION 
To avoid nefarious and extreme legislation, companies need to 
make it regularly occurring business practices to take care of their 
customer data.  For instance, though the California law covers only 
breaches involving unencrypted data; an advisory article suggests 
that companies would then be wise “to encrypt the personal 
information of its customers (or employees)” in order to avoid 
most of the explicit liability in the law.215  “Companies might also 
wish to consider installing firewalls and other software 
applications to guard their computer databases—particularly those 
containing ‘personal information’ of consumers or employees[,]” 
the piece goes on, offering advice that seems a sub-floor of what 
would constitute good business practices.216  Just like offline data 
would be stored in locked file cabinets to safeguard it, businesses, 
schools, and government agencies need to realize that the trust of 
their customers, students, and employees can very easily be eroded 
by a lack of protection.  Data protection is not just one way to 
follow the law, it makes for good business.217 
In seeking to be made whole or to punish individuals for 
malicious use of others’ data, myriad tools are available to both 
individual consumers as well as governmental enforcement 
entities.  State laws are beginning to address the remedies at the 
roots of the malady, the laissez-faire attitudes of some companies 
and agencies about data security and protection, and a marketplace 
with many different approaches is a robust test of what the best 
remedies will be at this still-nascent point in the development of 
electronic data storage.  It is far too premature to determine the 
best methods for ensuring the protection of consumer data, and the 
states should be allowed to continue to experiment to generate new 
ideas, testing the range of state laws against the ongoing breaches.  
 
 214 INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY, supra note 26, at 142–43. 
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The cost of a breach in business lost and in goodwill tarnished is 
far greater than the costs of compliance with the various laws, 
which simply encourage good data practices and responsible 
treatment of consumers. 
Justice Brandeis said that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”218  That is 
certainly mandated by the issue of privacy protection. 
 
 218 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
